Supreme Court Rules Seniority Calculation from Appointment Date

Kathmandu. The full bench of the Supreme Court has ruled that the seniority of civil servants appointed on the same date through open competition will be calculated from the 'date of appointment' and not from the 'date of joining'.

The full text of the verdict delivered by Justices Mahesh Sharma Paudel, Abdul Aziz Musalman, and Hariprasad Phuyal's full bench was recently made public. The precedent previously established, which considered the date of joining as the basis, has been declared 'ineffective with future effect'.

The previous interpretation in the case of 'Bishwaprasad Paneru versus Public Service Commission', which stated that seniority would be calculated 'from the date of joining', has been rendered 'ineffective' by this full bench. Henceforth, for those appointed through open competition, the date of appointment will be the primary basis for seniority.

Ramesh Kumar Chamar, a section officer working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court against the decisions of the Public Service Commission and the promotion committee. Chamar and another employee, Prathama Upreti, were appointed to the post of section officer on the same date, August 15, 2067 (Bikram Sambat), through open competition.

Prathama Upreti joined on August 15 of the same year, while Chamar joined on October 4, 2067 (Bikram Sambat), as he had to obtain a release from his previous post (Ranger). When the Public Service Commission, in the process of promotion, placed Upreti ahead based on seniority, stating that 'the one who joins first is senior', Chamar approached the court.

He filed the writ petition making the Public Service Commission, the former Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration, and the respondent Prathama Upreti as defendants. The Public Service Commission and the Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration presented written responses arguing that there is a legal provision and a long-standing practice of calculating seniority from the date of joining for those recommended and appointed through open competition.

The Civil Service Regulations provide a certain period (35 days excluding travel time) for joining after receiving the appointment letter.

The court has determined that it is not just for the seniority of employees appointed on the same date from the same advertisement to be lost simply because some join a few days later due to geographical remoteness or administrative procedures (like obtaining a release). This has been viewed in conjunction with Article 18 (Right to Equality) of the Constitution. The court has issued a 'mandamus' in the name of the respondents to calculate the seniority of the petitioner Ramesh Kumar from August 15, 2067 (date of appointment) and to proceed with his promotion-related actions based on that.

The Civil Service Regulations provide a certain period (35 days excluding travel time) for joining after receiving the appointment letter. The court's argument is that it is a violation of the law for an employee who joins within the stipulated time by utilizing the facility granted by law to be affected in terms of seniority.

"Once a person is appointed to a post in accordance with the law, their service is considered to have commenced. Unless otherwise provided by law, generally, when a person is appointed to a post, their service is deemed to have started from that day," the full text of the verdict states. "Considering the geographical conditions of our country, individuals from remote and accessible areas do not have the same situation to join on the same day after being appointed. A person required to join in an accessible area can join immediately, while a person in a remote area cannot join immediately."

The court had taken this case to a full bench to remove the ambiguity created by previous differing verdicts. By quashing the precedent that considered the date of joining as the basis, a new principle will be applied henceforth.

The verdict states, fundamentally, when circumstances beyond the control of the employee lead to a delayed joining, or when the reason for such delayed joining is natural or justifiable, considering the date of joining as the basis for seniority can create inequality among employees who received appointments on the same date. Therefore, it is not judicial and reasonable to interpret that the service period of a person appointed through open competition begins from the date of joining if they join without undue delay. Thus, it is simpler, logical, and judicial to consider the service period to have commenced from the date of appointment, not from the date of joining." The full bench of the Supreme Court also pointed out that Rule 11 of the Promotion Committee Procedures, 2073 (Bikram Sambat), also provides that the date of issuance of the appointment letter should be considered as the basis for calculating the seniority of those appointed through open competition.

The court had taken this case to a full bench to remove the ambiguity created by previous differing verdicts. By quashing the precedent that considered the date of joining as the basis, a new principle will be applied henceforth.