The Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Geopolitical Concept Facing Reality

Over the past decade, nations from Australia to France, India to Japan, and South Korea to the United Kingdom have embraced the Indo-Pacific strategy as a shared document of confidence. They believed that this strategy would stabilize the international system by forming maritime alliances.

With the belief that it would secure sea lanes and contain the rising continental power of China, numerous documents including 'White Papers, Framework Papers, and Vision Papers' were drafted.

While strategies can be announced in documents, their true test lies in weak links or 'choke points.' When maritime traffic is obstructed, missiles strike further than anticipated, and the world's most powerful navy cannot secure a passage just a day's distance from the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the core promise of the Indo-Pacific strategy comes under scrutiny. The idea that maritime military power can control global power begins to falter.

From the beginning, the Indo-Pacific strategy was more of an expanded concept than a coherent strategic framework—a form of intellectual 'branding' designed to perpetuate the old maritime order. It linked two oceans, the Indian and the Pacific, under a single name.

These oceans do not naturally form a connected system. Rather, those who named them did so to serve their own objectives. It was done to expand maritime power in an era where power faces structural limitations.

• Who is the Indo-Pacific really for?

At the core of the Indo-Pacific concept, it is clear that the strategic understanding of one power—the United States—stands above all others. This strategy is defined by American dominance. It views the world through the lens of sea lanes, choke points, and the continuous expansion of maritime movement, where power is projected, alliances are built, and the external order is maintained from the sea.

Thus, the Indo-Pacific strategy is merely the latest expression of the strategic habits long maintained by the U.S. America seeks to transform geography into a navigable 'theater' for maritime hegemony.

For the U.S., the Indo-Pacific is entirely meaningful and relevant. It extends American strategic methods across a vast maritime region, connects partners and allies into a single network, empowers those with easy access, and ensures necessary supplies from the sea. It preserves the primacy of maritime power as a principle for organizing regional order, helps the U.S. remain a global balancer, and makes it easier to influence events without being geographically connected.

Over the last ten years, the U.S. has tried to impose this logic on regions, countries, and powers for whom it held little meaning or importance.

Take India, for example. India is often called the foundation of the 'Indo' part of the Indo-Pacific. Including India in the strategy is presented as a strategic victory, often described as an integrated alliance connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific to balance against China. However, this narrative fundamentally misinterprets India's strategic reality.

India is not primarily a maritime power; it is a continental power with maritime interests. Its primary security concerns are land-based. It has a disputed and tense border with China, an enduring rivalry with Pakistan since its inception, and the challenge of maintaining internal unity within its vast and diverse territory. India's strategic culture is defined by these realities. It is more concerned with controlling its own borders, maintaining stability at the frontier, and increasing control over the continent.

The Indo-Pacific strategy does not address these Indian concerns. It offers India a role in maritime alliances but provides no meaningful assistance in its primary areas of competition. It encourages participation in maritime cooperation and forums like the 'Quad,' but these are merely auxiliary or secondary issues for the core of Indian security. India is being asked to participate in a system that was not built for its own needs.

• Has the Indo-Pacific concept sunk at sea?

It has become increasingly clear over the past decade that the Indo-Pacific concept stands on weak ground. It assumes that maritime dominance is still the decisive factor for regional outcomes. It is believed that control of sea lanes, naval supremacy, and aggressive deployment are necessary for strategic order, but the assumptions stated in every sentence you have read are changing today.

The U.S. is currently struggling to ensure passage in the 'Strait of Hormuz,' where threats remain constant. U.S. 'Carrier Strike Groups,' once considered symbols of dominance, are operating far beyond the range where Iranian missiles can target them.

The influence of what was once considered absolute maritime supremacy is waning. The geometry of war has changed. It is now difficult to control from the sea; instead, competition is increasingly happening from land to sea. Sometimes, control is even being denied.

Across the Eurasia continent, there has been a major shift in the balance between maritime attacks and land-based resistance.

There have been sweeping changes in missile technology, air defense systems, and long-range strike capabilities. Projecting power into the continental landmass has become challenging and extremely costly for maritime powers. 'Anti-Access/Area Denial' (A2/AD) systems are no longer just tactical developments; they represent a structural change in the geometry of power.

Where maritime military forces once had access and could strike and return with relative freedom, there are now multi-layered defensive networks. These networks extend from the deep interior of the land to the adjacent seas. The cost of attempting to penetrate these areas has increased significantly. The margin for error has decreased. The situation has shifted to favor defenders over attackers.

At this very moment, continental powers are strengthening their positions. They are becoming more empowered through infrastructure, mutual connectivity, and economic integration. Rail networks, pipelines, and overland trade routes are reducing dependence on maritime choke points.

'Strategic depth,' or the distance between borders and key centers, was once thought to be determined solely by geography, but it is now undergoing active change.

The Indo-Pacific framework has failed to account for this fundamental shift. It continues to operate on an old-fashioned style, relying on the belief that maritime movement can be decisively projected onto land. It assumes that the sea is the primary route for power flow, a belief that is becoming increasingly irrelevant.

A moment of significant change is coming, even for countries like Australia and Japan that are firm believers in the Indo-Pacific concept.

(From Asia Times)