Investigation Report Reveals Lack of Coordination Among Security Forces During Recent Protests

The investigation report has exposed a lack of coordination among security agencies during the 'Jyanji' protests that occurred on Bhadra 23 and 24. According to the report prepared after studying the incident under the leadership of Gauribahadur Karki, errors ranging from legal ambiguities to technical shortcomings were responsible for the ineffective coordination between the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force (APF), and the Nepali Army. The biggest problem highlighted by the report is the absence of an 'Integrated Command System'.

The report states that operations were ineffective because, while deployed in the field, all security agencies operated under their own 'chain of command,' and there was no clear legal provision to bring them under a single leadership.

Furthermore, ambiguity between Article 267(6) of the Nepal Constitution and Section 6(2) of the Local Administration Act, 2028, regarding the mobilization of the Nepali Army also caused problems. The report notes a lack of consensus between security agencies and local administration on the conditions under which the Nepali Army would be mobilized versus 'deployed.' Beyond legal and policy complexities, practical and technical difficulties also appear to have increased the distance between the security agencies.

Due to the different Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), arms, and equipment of the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, and Nepali Army, joint operations were difficult. Additionally, the report indicates that the communication sets (walkie-talkies) of these three security agencies were not directly interconnected, preventing immediate dialogue among field commanders.

The lack of regular joint exercises on how to work together in the field during crises added to the confusion, according to the report. Negligence in information exchange and command flow was also considered a key link in the coordination failure. It was found that prior intelligence received from the National Investigation Department was not taken seriously by other security agencies, and this crucial information did not reach the lower levels in time.

Citing an example of delay in the decision-making process, the report stated: 'Although army mobilization was suggested at 5 PM on Bhadra 24, the curfew order was only issued at 8:30 PM.'

Moreover, the report highlighted a serious error where the Nepal Police conducted a 'tactical withdrawal' or left barracks during the tense situation of the protests without any coordination with the Army and Armed Police Force. The report concludes that the main reasons for the lack of coordination between the police and the army during the protests were the absence of legal clarity, lack of integrated leadership, and differences in communication technology and procedural standards.