Assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Will Not Cause Immediate Collapse, But Will Lead to Increased Hardening

The assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei does not mean the Iranian regime will immediately collapse. This is a hasty understanding that reflects more 'wild imagination' than serious analysis. 

Yes, we are feeling a major seismic shock, the most dangerous blow since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. But the important political question is not how bad the blow was, but rather, was the system designed to withstand such a massive shock?

Evidence so far shows that the Iranian system was designed from the beginning not to be merely the shadow of one person, no matter how high that person's position was.

Iran's Islamic Republic is not like the absolute rulers of the Arab countries we have seen, where the entire structure collapses like a house of cards upon the death of the leader. It is a complex ideological and security mechanism, headed by a religious leader, but beneath it lies a strong network of constitutional, security, administrative, and economic institutions. All these institutions work not to serve an individual, but to preserve the existence of the regime.

Therefore, the assassination of the Supreme Leader does not automatically end the state. It shifts the crisis from preserving the leader's life to maintaining internal unity. The struggle to maintain this unity is the real challenge now.

The Iranian constitution itself was drafted keeping in mind the danger of a power vacuum. According to Article 111 of the Constitution, if the position of the Supreme Leader becomes vacant, an interim council takes charge until a new leader is elected. 

Following the announcement of Khamenei's assassination, power was transferred to a three-member council comprising President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, and Guardian Council member Alireza Arafe. The 88-member Assembly of Experts was tasked with electing the new leader. We can call this a survival protocol to sustain the rule.

However, looking only at the constitutional process can be a mistake. The balance of power is more important than the constitution. Here, one must understand the three levels of power in the Iranian regime:

1. Religious Legitimacy: The office of the Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts, and the Guardian Council. This provides the theoretical basis for the rule.

2. Security and Military Sector: Its backbone is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This is not just a military institution, but the true guardian of power.

3. Political Bureaucracy: The government, presidency, judiciary, and economic apparatus that manage the daily operations of the state.

Among all these, the IRGC is the most decisive. After Khamenei's death, the main question is not 'Is there a constitutional mechanism?', but rather, 'Will the IRGC remain united?'. This organization is not under the President; it is the protector of the revolution, holding unilateral control over internal security, regional decisions, and economic networks. 

Due to the war and the assassination of senior commanders, the IRGC has strengthened its grip on decision-making and adopted a decentralized system, allowing lower levels to continue functioning even if the top leadership is eliminated.

This means the blow hit the head, but it has not paralyzed the limbs (organs).

Current indications suggest that the Iranian regime will not fall solely due to this war. In many cases, ideological regimes become tougher and more unified when faced with an external existential threat. Iranian opposition figures also admit that external bombing alone will not topple the regime; it requires internal popular uprising.

However, the fact that the regime does not collapse immediately does not mean Iran is safe. The regime might survive, but Iran will emerge from this war exhausted, suspicious, and even more constricted, especially after the selection of Khamenei's son, Mojtaba Khamenei. The regime is now likely to become harsher and less self-confident.

When a regime emerges having suffered such great damage and a threat to its leadership, it chooses only the option of security. It begins to view its opponents and dissenters as security threats. This trend has already begun to appear. Internal rifts are starting to show between the IRGC hardliners and the comparatively softer faction of President Pezeshkian.

In conclusion, the Iranian regime is not on the verge of collapse right now, but it also does not appear capable of emerging from this war intact as before. The regime will survive, but the cost will be heavy: excessive dependence on the IRGC, a narrow political circle, and extreme tightening of internal security.

To put it plainly, this war may not end the regime, but it will eliminate the remaining flexibility within the regime. When a system loses its flexibility, it may prolong its life through the use of force, but it hollows out from within. 

This is the current Iranian paradox: the regime has not fallen, but it has entered a new phase of 'anxious rigidity,' which may save it today but weaken it tomorrow.

The author Abdullah Fahad Al-Nafisi is a Kuwaiti scholar and former member of the Kuwaiti Parliament.