The New Economics of War: How Cheap Drones Challenge Advanced Defense Systems

Iran is currently politically devastated. An Iranian naval vessel has sunk. Thousands of targets inside Iran have been destroyed by airstrikes. Thousands of drones and missiles used by Iran in its attacks were destroyed mid-air. Despite reports of military success everywhere, Israel, the United States, and Gulf nations are feeling uneasy.

They are concerned about what might happen if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains united. They worry about what will happen if Iran continues to attack using cheap drones, missiles, and small projectiles.

A similar scenario is unfolding in the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf. Small drones approach at high speed, targeting an American 'destroyer.' Immediately, the ship's 'alarm' sounds. The expensive 'sensors' of the destroyer's defense system begin to activate. Missiles are launched to target the small drones. 

Such simple drones flying over water can be manufactured for a few thousand dollars. However, destroying them costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. A destroyer requires various types of defense systems to protect itself.

All these events reveal the new economics of war. Cheap goods can defeat expensive ones. Small arms fired in large numbers can overcome highly advanced weaponry. Speed defeats old practices. Iran currently relies on a large quantity of drones, missiles, and small projectiles. 

This is not due to decades of practice, production, and effective use. It is because Iranian weapons and drones are capable of overwhelming American and Israeli defense systems. Iranian cheap weapons force the other side to defend at a high cost. This significantly increases the opposing side's cost of war even with minimal expenditure.

Every successful defense system incurs significant financial damage or loss. Furthermore, replacing expensive infrastructure like radars and sensors worth billions of dollars takes years. There is also an equal possibility that even a simple drone could cause destruction at any moment. A tactical victory can also end up as a strategic defeat.

It is uncertain whether Iran will win or lose in the new economics of war. However, it seems likely that it will lose at a very high price. The ongoing conflict is certain to set important benchmarks in many respects. The old American and Western notion that victory is achieved through technically superior, swift, and precise military strikes is now collapsing. 

Rivals like Russia and Iran have repeatedly forced defensive powers to incur high costs through low-cost attacks. There is nothing unusual about this. A new military reality has been clear to us for years in Ukraine and other regions. 

However, Western decision-makers, military planners, and arms manufacturers have been ignoring this new reality. Ego also plays a role here. They are suffering from a 'this is how it goes' mentality and bureaucratic inertia. 

Those involved in attacks with high military expenditure often lose the war. Those who lose the war at a low cost are ultimately able to achieve their objectives. Those who lose at a very high cost lose a lot regardless of the situation. We are clearly seeing in the ongoing Gulf conflict how the new economics of war can change the geopolitical balance of power. 

We have been seeing a similar scenario in Ukraine for years regarding air defense. The same situation is now being felt more prominently in the Gulf region. Iran and Russia are producing drones and missiles on an industrial scale. Their production is continuously increasing. 

On the other hand, even as the Russia-Ukraine war approaches its fourth year, the West has not significantly increased the production of air defense and guided missiles. Now, missile systems like 'Thaad' and 'Patriot,' which used to take a year to produce, are being fired within a few days. 

There is a scramble for limited supplies worldwide, whether in Ukraine, Europe, the US, or currently in the Gulf nations. However, the financial resources available globally seem insufficient for the production of weapons and defense systems. Meanwhile, Russian and Iranian drone and missile production appears capable of continuously replenishing their stockpiles. China is closely observing this entire situation. 

It is learning major lessons for the future. In this situation, NATO countries, especially European NATO members, are not in a good position. They have built high-level defense systems. They are also purchasing systems of the same standard. Europe is currently very cautious about the complexities involved in building defense systems. 

The understanding held by policymakers and manufacturers there is that 'everything is complex. Nothing is simple or easy. Our system is the fastest.' However, high-quality systems, which are few in number, cannot protect Europe. Complexity without speed is ineffective. While Europe seeks to rely only on efficiency, adversaries are beginning to depend on mass production.

In a war like the current one, even systems considered fully effective may not be decisive. The Patriot missile is one such high-quality and capable system. However, because we do not have many guided missiles, we cannot easily replace the Patriot. We also cannot immediately add more without depleting minimum stockpiles. Therefore, despite being considered effective, the Patriot system becomes helpless against asymmetric attacks.

The new economics of war is forcing us to think differently. This very week, the US military announced plans to replicate and deploy cheap drones similar to Iranian 'Shahed' drones on the battlefield. What is needed now for war are large quantities of simple and robust systems. Industrial-scale production is required for both defense and resistance. 

As the necessity and seriousness of war increase, production must be made scalable to meet demand. This requires political decisions that allow for speed. To achieve this, offensive technology and corresponding industrial policies are needed, which prioritize security as their main function. 

(From The National Interest)